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Abstract 
Gender quotas aim to increase women’s parliamentary representation. However, the 
effectiveness of quotas varies. This article explores this issue further by examining the 
case of Poland, where gender quotas were introduced in 2011. The Polish case 
presents an interesting puzzle. Although the overall number of women candidates 
increased almost twofold in comparison with the pre-quota period, this translated into 
only a slight increase in the number of women deputies in 2011 and 2015. Hence, the 
impact of quotas was limited. However, the partisan analysis shows that there was a 
significant variation among individual parties: whereas some parties promoted 
wholeheartedly women’s access to political office, other parties did not facilitate it. 
By drawing on rational choice institutionalism, this article shows that institutions and 
preferences of political parties matter for the effectiveness of gender quotas. In the 
case of ineffective gender quota policy, political parties have a final say in women’s 
parliamentary representation. 
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1. Introduction 
Gender quotas aim to increase women’s parliamentary representation. They have 
become an increasingly popular method of addressing the parliamentary 
underrepresentation of women. The global spread of gender quotas originated during 
the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women which was held in Beijing in 
1995. The resulting Platform for Action advocated that governments should take 
action in order to ensure women’s equal access to political office and decision-making 
(Kenny and Verge, 2016). Consequently, the number of countries adopting gender 
quotas has increased over the past few years and currently some 100 countries are 
using gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Dahlerup, 2012). However, the effectiveness of 
quotas - that is, the extent to which gender quotas enhance women’s parliamentary 
representation - varies. For example, in the European Union, where nine countries 
currently use legislative gender quotas, women’s representation ranges from 39% in 
Belgium and Spain to 22% in Ireland
1
 in 2016 (IDEA, 2016; Inter-parliamentary 
Union, 2016).
2
  
This article examines the effectiveness of legislative gender quotas in Poland. 
The case of Poland merits scholarly attention. It is the only country in Eastern Europe, 
except for the Balkan states, which uses legislative gender quotas and there is hardly 
any research on gender quotas in Eastern Europe.
3
 Moreover, the Polish case presents 
an interesting puzzle. Although the overall number of women candidates increased 
almost twofold in comparison with the pre-quota period, it translated into only a slight 
increase in the percentage of women deputies in the lower chamber of parliament, 
from 20% in 2007 to 24% in 2011 and 27% in 2015. So why was there only a slight 
overall increase in women’s representation and, hence, such a modest impact of 
gender quotas? Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, this article argues that the 
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effectiveness of gender quotas depends on formal institutions (policy design) and 
political parties.  
Case study research is best suited for an in-depth country-specific analysis 
(see Gerring, 2004). It will draw out the nuanced nature of gender quotas and their 
effects, in addition to the detailed analysis of party candidate selection methods. This 
research clearly shows that an in-depth case study can shed additional light on the 
effectiveness of gender quotas whereas, quantitative research overlooks qualitative 
differences. The primary data is based on a unique dataset on candidates provided by 
the State Electoral Commission, parliamentary debates and interviews with women 
deputies and activists. This article uses a diachronic comparison of two election 
results in 2011 and 2015 but also briefly compares them with the 2007 pre-quota 
results.  
This article is an important contribution to the research on gender quotas and 
women’s parliamentary representation for several reasons. First, there is hardly any 
research concerning women in parliaments in Eastern Europe and the case of Poland 
has not been included in major studies of gender quotas around the world. By 
examining the case of Poland, this article helps to explain nuances to the logic of 
promoting gender quotas in new democracies. Second, this article contributes to the 
theoretical studies by using a novel approach to analysing gender quotas. Rational 
choice institutionalism provides an explicit framework for studying preferences of 
political parties and institutional constraints. Legislative gender quotas are 
implemented by political parties, and hence, there is a need for party-level analysis. 
This article investigates intra-party mechanisms, both formal and informal, that can 
explain varied effectiveness of quotas. In addition, formal institutions matter for the 
effectiveness of gender quotas because policy design influences women’s placement 
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on party lists, and hence, chances for being elected. Third, a public policy approach is 
needed in order to examine effectiveness. Policy evaluation assesses policy design 
and the extent of policy implementation: that is, who executed policies and how they 
are executed. The literature stipulates that variation in quota effectiveness is caused 
by inadequate implementation but this article shows that it is due to policy design.  
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first section 
presents a literature review on gender quotas. The second section puts forward the 
analytical framework based on rational choice institutionalism. The third section is an 
empirical analysis which presents a diachronic comparison of election results and 
women’s representation in the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament, the Sejm. It is 
followed by a discussion focusing on policy design and the preferences of political 
parties. Finally, the concluding section summarises the findings. 
 
2. The Literature on Gender Quotas 
There is a burgeoning literature on gender quotas (e.g. Dahlerup, 2006; European 
Parliament, 2013; Htun, 2016; Kittilson, 2001; Krook, 2009; 2014; Praud, 2012). 
Initially, the literature focused on explaining the adoption of gender quotas but 
subsequently, has also addressed their implementation. The most recent developments 
focus on the effectiveness of gender quotas (see e.g. Franceschet et al., 2012; Paxton 
and Hughes, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). 
Before the main scholarly arguments are discussed, a definition of gender 
quotas should be outlined. According to Dahlerup (2006), a legislative gender quota is 
‘a type of equal opportunity measure that forces the nominating bodies, in most 
political systems the political parties, to recruit, nominate or select more women for 
political positions’ (Dahlerup 2006: 6).  It is a ‘legal reform, which requires political 
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parties to nominate between 25 and 50 per cent of women candidates’ (Krook et al., 
2009: 795). For Schwindt-Bayer (2009) gender quotas are ‘”fast track” mechanisms 
for increasing women’s representation’ (Schwindt-Bayer 2009: 5). There are different 
types of quotas. According to Krook (2009; 2010), quota policies include: reserved 
seats, party quotas and legislative quotas. Quota policy based on reserved seats means 
one of the following: creating distinct electoral rolls for women; designating separate 
districts for them; or allocating seats for women based on each party’s proportion of 
the vote. Party quotas are voluntary measures set out by political parties which can be 
applied to the electoral list as a whole, to specific seats or constituencies (Krook, 
2010; Lovenduski and Norris, 2005; Campbell et al., 2006). Finally, legislative quotas, 
which are enacted through reforms to electoral laws or constitutions, stipulate that 
women must constitute a certain percentage of candidates on all party lists.  
Despite the common goal of increasing the numbers of women elected to 
parliaments, quotas have had varied effects on women’s representation. The impact of 
gender quotas can be moderated by several factors. First, the type of electoral system 
matters (Norris, 2006). As early as the 1950s, Duverger (1955) highlighted the role of 
electoral systems in determining the number of women elected to parliaments. 
Majoritarian systems inhibit women’s parliamentary representation. By contrast, 
electoral systems with party list proportional representation and large district 
magnitudes favour the election of women. In such systems, a woman can be placed 
further down on the party list and still be elected (Jones, 1998; Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 
2006). However, there is a caveat here. The literature on electoral systems points to 
the complexity of the relationship between preferential voting and women’s 
representation (see Marsh, 1985). The most recent findings demonstrate that the 
effects of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems are not as 
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positive as those of closed-list systems (Jones and Navia, 1999; Górecki and 
Kukołowicz, 2014). In an open-list system, voters may alter the order by preferring 
other candidates rather than women (Matland, 2006). A closed-list system with a 
zipper, which means alternating men and women candidates, is regarded as the most 
advantageous type of electoral system for women because candidates are 
automatically elected in the order determined by the party (Millard, 2014). 
Second, policy design can influence the implementation of gender quotas and 
hence their effectiveness. There are three main aspects of policy design which are 
examined in the literature. The first is a quota size. Quotas that require more women 
on party ballots lead to the election of more women (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). 
However, women’s electoral success depends not only on the number of women but 
also on their place on the list. Hence, the second aspect of policy design is placement 
on the party list. Placement mandates are ‘rules requiring that women occupy certain 
positions on candidate lists’ (Paxton and Hughes 2015: 332). The literature 
corroborates that positions higher up the ballot mean higher chances of being elected 
to parliament (e.g. Faas and Schoen, 2006; Marcinkiewicz, 2014; Millard, 2014). The 
third aspect of policy design is sanctions for non-compliance. They are ‘measures that 
penalise parties for failing to comply with quota provisions’ (Paxton and Hughes, 
2015: 332). Schwindt-Bayer (2009) distinguishes between strong enforcement and 
weak enforcement. The former implies the strictest sanction: for example, the party 
ballot is rejected if it does not abide by the gender quota whereas the latter implies a 
weak sanction where laws do not eliminate the party from electoral competition. If 
there are no sanctions, implementation is not likely to occur. 
Third, ideology is important. Left-wing parties tend to be more sensitive to 
women’s representation whereas right-wing parties are either hostile or indifferent to 
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the issue. Hence, left-wing parties are more likely to implement gender quotas 
(Matland, 1993; Kittilson, 1999; Millard, 2004; Praud, 2012). 
Fourth, changing norms might play a role. Domestic and international norms 
are becoming women-friendly and women’s presence in politics is now acceptable 
and desirable. Party elites might be accepting these new norms and gender activists’ 
arguments that having a higher number of women in politics is normatively 
appropriate (Bush, 2011; Paxton and Hughes, 2015). For example, the European 
Union promotes the idea of gender equality among its member states (European 
Parliament, 2013; MacRae, 2012). 
Finally, the role of political parties is examined in the literature. Kittilson 
(1999) analyses the impact of political parties by looking at party organisation, party 
ideology, women party activists and party quotas. Moreover, the literature points to 
the importance of parties as gatekeepers to political office (Norris and Lovenduski, 
1995; Norris, 1996; Murray, 2004). For Norris and Lovenduski (1995), the outcome 
of particular parties’ selection processes can be understood in terms of the interaction 
between the supply of candidates wishing to stand for office and the demands of party 
gatekeepers who select the candidates. Gender quotas, then, challenge the relationship 
between voters, parties and representatives by making parties revise their selection 
practices in terms of gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006).  
Whilst there is a burgeoning literature on gender quotas in well-established 
democracies, there is scarce research on gender quotas in the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe, although there are a few notable exceptions. Gwiazda (2015) explains 
the adoption of gender quotas in Poland. Millard (2014) and Górecki and Kukołowicz 
(2014) examine the implementation of gender quotas for the 2011 election in Poland. 
But this research pays little attention to the interaction of individual party preferences 
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on gender equality with formal and informal institutions, which is addressed in this 
article, by examining two elections: in 2011 and 2015. 
Moreover, although the important role of parties in shaping access to political 
office is widely recognised, Kenny and Verge (2016) note that there have been 
surprisingly few systematic studies into candidate selection and recruitment despite 
the fact that candidate selection is at the heart of what political parties do. Thus, this 
article also addresses this research gap. 
 
3. The Analytical Framework 
Examining effectiveness means analysing the extent to which gender quotas are 
successful in enhancing women’s parliamentary representation. I adopt insights from 
the public policy literature and rational choice institutionalism in order to shed more 
light on the effectiveness of gender quotas.  
The public policy literature specifies that policy evaluation is ‘the systematic 
assessment of the operation and/or the outcomes of a program or policy, compared to 
a set of explicit or implicit standards, as a means of contributing to the improvement 
of the program or policy’ (Weiss, 1998: 4). Knill and Tosun (2012) raise two 
important questions about policy evaluation: Has the policy attained its objectives? Is 
the failure to meet the policy goals related to the design of public policy or its 
implementation by political actors? Consequently, in order to assess the effectiveness 
of gender quotas both formal institutions (policy design) and actions by political 
actors should be considered. 
Rational choice institutionalism emphasises the relationship between political 
actors’ rational action and institutional constraints (see e.g. Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Shepsle and Bonchek, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002). Hence, the analytical framework 
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presented here is based on the combination of institutional and partisan factors. The 
hypotheses below integrate political parties’ preferences with the institutional 
arrangement provided by gender quota policy. Two hypotheses will be tested. The 
first hypothesis refers to formal institutions whereas the second hypothesis refers to 
political actors, in this case, political parties. 
Formal institutions mean policy design as stipulated in the gender quota law. 
Formal institutions matter for the effectiveness of gender quotas because they provide 
the institutional context within which political parties operate with respect to 
candidates’ recruitment and selection. According to North (1990), ‘institutions are the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 3). Formal institutions are ‘formal 
constraints’ and ‘formal rules’ such as constitutions, statutes and contracts (North, 
1990: 46). Two specific formal provisions are examined here: sanctions for non-
compliance and placement mandates which are shown in the literature to be vital for 
gender quota effectiveness.
4
 
Hypothesis 1a: High costs of non-compliance increase the effectiveness of gender 
quotas. Even if there is policy incongruence, a political party will still implement the 
policy because of the high cost.  
Hypothesis 1b: Placement mandates increase the effectiveness of gender quotas 
because political parties must place women in the top places, thus increasing the 
chances of election. 
 
In addition, political actors are important. Political parties are in charge of gender 
quota implementation: if they support gender equality and gender quotas, greater 
quota effectiveness is expected. Gender equality provides for equal treatment and 
 11 
equal rights of men and women, and can be guaranteed through legal reform 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003). Gender quotas provide for equal opportunity in political 
representation (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Hence, political parties who favour gender 
equality and gender quotas will support women’s representation in parliament. 
Hypothesis 2: Political parties are expected to enhance women’s parliamentary 
representation if their preferences are congruent with gender equality and gender 
quotas.  
A scholarly reason for using the analytical framework based on rational choice 
institutionalism is that it provides an explicit and systematic methodology for 
studying preferences of political actors involved in policy implementation and the role 
of institutional constraints. In what follows, I will test the hypotheses in the Polish 
case.  
 
4. The Case of Poland 
Legislative gender quotas were adopted in Poland to enhance women’s parliamentary 
representation (Gwiazda, 2015). At the beginning of democratic transition in the early 
1990s, women were underrepresented in parliament. Over time the situation slightly 
improved. Table 1 shows the percentage of women deputies from 1991-2015. In the 
first democratically elected Sejm, there were only 9.6% of women deputies, the 
number increasing to 13% in the subsequent elections. In 2001, there was an increase 
to 20% which can be explained by the use of voluntary party quotas.
5
 After the 2011 
election, 24% of deputies were women and after the 2015 election, 27% (Sejm, 
2015).
6
  
 
Table 1. Women’s representation in the Sejm, 1991-2015.
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 12 
    Terms 
 
 
  Women 
1
st
 term: 
1991-3 
 
2
nd
 term: 
1993-7 
3
rd
 term: 
1997-
2001 
4
th
 term: 
2001-5 
5
th
  term: 
2005-7 
6
th
  term: 
2007-11 
7
th
 term: 
2011-15 
8
th
 term 
2015- 
Out of 460 44 60 62 93 94 94 110 125 
Percentage 9.6% 13% 13.5% 20.2% 20.4% 20.4% 24% 27% 
Source: Sejm 2015. 
 
The legislative gender quota was introduced before the October 2011 election. The 
Act of 5 January 2011
8
 on the electoral code stipulates that at least 35% of all 
candidates on party lists must be women and 35% must be men (Article 211.3). The 
law does not provide for a placement mandate: that is, there is no provision 
concerning the ranking of candidates on party lists. However, there is a sanction for 
non-compliance. If the list does not abide by the quota as stipulated in Article 211.3, 
the electoral commission calls on the person submitting the list to rectify an error 
within three days. If it is not rectified, the commission refuses to register the list 
(Article 215.5). Hence, the penalty for non-compliance is considered to be high. The 
quota applies only to proportional elections: that is, the Sejm election, the European 
Parliament election and municipal and county council elections. The quota does not 
apply to the majoritarian electoral system which is used for the Senate election and 
municipal councils of a maximum of 20,000 citizens. Elections to the Sejm are 
conducted using the open list proportional representation electoral system, with the 
d’Hondt formula for vote-seat conversion and the 5% electoral threshold for single 
parties and the 8% threshold for coalitions. The 460 deputies are elected from 41 
constituencies, with district magnitudes ranging from 7 to 20.  
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Table 2 demonstrates the total number and percentage of women candidates in 
2007, 2011 and 2015. In 2007, when there was no legislative gender quota, there were 
1,428 women candidates. They constituted 23.08% of all candidates on party lists. 
The adoption of gender quotas significantly increased the total number and percentage 
of women candidates on all party lists to 3,063 (43.54%) in 2011 and 3,328 (42.35%) 
in 2015. Even if we only consider the parties which were elected to parliament 
(winning parties), the number is equally high: 1,932 (42.73%) in 2011 and 1,847 
(41.5%) in 2015. However, while there was a significant increase in the number of 
women candidates, this did not translate automatically into a significant increase in 
the number of women deputies in 2011 and 2015. In 2011, women got 110 seats (out 
of 460) in the Sejm, which constituted 24% of all seats; whereas in 2015, women got 
125 seats (out of 460) in the Sejm, which constituted 27% of all seats.  
 
Table 2. The total number and percentage of women candidates in 2007, 2011, 2015 
 2007 (no quota) 2011 2015 
Total number of 
candidates of all 
parties  
6,187 7,035 7,889 
 
Total number of 
women 
1,428 3,063 3,341 
 
Percentage of women 23.08% 43.54% 42.35% 
Total number of 
candidates of 
winning parties  
3,658 4,521 4,449 
Total number of 
women 
732 1,932 1,847 
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Percentage of women 20.15% 42.73% 41.5% 
Source: State Electoral Commission 2007, 2011, 2015. 
 
In addition to the total data, party-level data is vital given the fact that political parties 
are in charge of recruiting candidates for representatives and deciding on their 
placement on party lists. Table 3 presents the number and percentage of women 
candidates and deputies for political parties which won seats in the Sejm in 2007, 
2011 and 2015. 
 
Table 3. The number and percentage of women candidates and women deputies for 
each political party in the Sejm, 2007-2015. 
 
The analysis of women’s representation in individual political parties in the Sejm is 
revealing. In 2007, the results were similar across four parties. The percentage of 
women candidates ranged from 18% to 22% whereas the percentage of elected 
women deputies ranged from 3.2% for the Polish Peasant Party, 20.5% for the Law 
and Justice party, 20.8% for the Democratic Left Alliance and 23% for Civic Platform. 
After the introduction of gender quotas in 2011, an increasing discrepancy in 
individual party performance can be observed. Although the percentage of women 
candidates significantly increased and averaged 42.7% (from almost 40% for Law and 
Justice to 44% for the Democratic Left Alliance), only one party elected a significant 
number of women. Civic Platform was the best performer with 72 female deputies, 
that is, 34.8% of its all deputies. The worst performer, the Polish Peasant Party, had 
only two women in its parliamentary ranks: 7.1%. Both Law and Justice and the 
Democratic Left Alliance experienced a drop in women’s representation in 
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comparison with the 2007 results. In 2015, the percentage of women candidates 
remained at a similarly high level and averaged 41.5%. It ranged from 39.5% for Law 
and Justice to 43.4% for the newly established party Nowoczesna (Modern). Despite a 
high percentage of women candidates only two parties had a high percentage of 
women deputies. Similar to the 2011 election, Civic Platform performed very well. It 
had the second highest percentage of women candidates and was represented by 36% 
of women in the Sejm. Another party was ‘Modern’ with the highest percentage of 
women candidates and deputies. 
 
5. Discussion 
The aforementioned analysis raises two important questions. Given legislative gender 
quotas, how can we explain a modest overall increase in women’s parliamentary 
representation in Poland? How can we explain a good performance by Civic Platform 
and Modern? 
Political parties had to comply with gender quota policy because if they did 
not they could not have registered their lists. The cost of non-compliance was very 
high. Thus, political parties, who are rational actors, were expected to implement 
gender quotas. In fact, quota policy was implemented by political parties as shown by 
the level of women candidates which exceeded 35% for all parties. Yet, the overall 
impact of gender quotas on women candidates’ electoral success was modest. The 
high penalty by itself did not significantly increase the effectiveness of gender quotas. 
This brings us to analysing other aspects of policy design and the preferences of 
political parties. I will start with the latter.  
What are the preferences of political parties concerning women’s 
representation? Are political parties fully committed to it? Party preferences 
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concerning gender equality are expected to shape the experience of women in party 
ranks and their chances of electoral success. Specifically, political parties’ affirmative 
actions and policies towards gender equality and gender quotas have a positive impact 
on women’s parliamentary representation. Political parties that were represented in 
the Sejm in 2011-15 are presented below. 
Civic Platform (PO) is a centre-right liberal-conservative party, established in 
2001 and in government from 2007-2015. It promotes the participation of women 
using its own, internal regulations. The party quota was used for the first time in the 
2007 election. In the parliamentary debate in February 2010, one of Civic Platform’s 
women deputies confirmed that the party used a rule that there had to be at least one 
woman in the first three places on party lists (Sejm, 2010). For the 2011 election, 
Civic Platform’s lists had to abide by formal party quotas. Civic Platform introduced 
changes to its statute to include at least one woman in the top three places and at least 
two women in the top five places (Druciarek et al., 2012; Interview 1). Not only did 
Civic Platform have party quotas, but it was also the party that supported legislative 
gender quotas. In fact, the 2011 gender quota policy was approved by the Civic 
Platform-Polish Peasant Party government. Civic Platform and, in particular, its 
leader and then Prime Minister Donald Tusk supported the adoption of gender quotas 
and played a significant role in promoting women (see Gwiazda, 2015). Before the 
October 2015 parliamentary election, the Board of Civic Platform adopted a 
resolution (Resolution 11/2015) which stipulated that: 
  
Party regional authorities are obliged to shape the regional lists of candidates for deputies 
in such a way that: 1) The number of women candidates and the number of men 
candidates may not be less than 35% of the total number of candidates for each 
constituency list. 2) Out of the first five places in each constituency list neither men nor 
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women can occupy more than three places, 3) Of the first three places in each 
constituency list neither men nor women can occupy more than two places (Civic 
Platform, 2015).  
 
In addition, Civic Platform supported women in office by nominating Ewa Kopacz as 
Poland’s female Prime Minister in September 2014, taking over from Donald Tusk, 
who was appointed president of the European Council. 
The Law and Justice party (PiS) is a right-wing conservative party founded in 
2001 by the Kaczyński brothers,
9
 which was in government from 2005-7 and won the 
2015 parliamentary election. Law and Justice supports conservative values and is 
unsympathetic to gender equality. For the 2015 election, PiS had a female candidate 
for Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, who subsequently became Prime Minister after 
PiS’s electoral victory. Nevertheless, Law and Justice supports traditional values. PiS 
is critical of gender equality and is hostile to what it calls, ‘gender-ideology’ 
(Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz, 2016). In fact, on many occasions PiS deputies have 
expressed their negative opinions on gender equality (see Jankowski and 
Marcinkiewicz, 2016). For example, Law and Justice voted against the ratification of 
the Council of Europe’s ‘Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence.’ In the parliamentary debate, one of PiS deputies said 
that ‘the Convention is against Polish culture, tradition and religion’ (Sejm, 2015b). 
PiS also voted against the introduction of gender quotas (Sejm, 2010c). In addition, 
Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński called non-winnable positions on party 
lists as ‘women’s places’ (Chełstowska et al., 2015).  
The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) was established in 1991 as the direct 
organisational successor to the communist party. It won parliamentary elections in 
1993 and 2001 but its support collapsed in the 2005 election and in 2011 it suffered a 
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massive slump in support, gaining only 8.24% of the vote (State Electoral 
Commission, 1989–2011). In 2015, SLD contested the election as part of the ‘United 
Left’ coalition with ‘Your Movement’ (former Palikot movement) and a number of 
smaller left-wing groupings, except for the new party of radical left called ‘Together’ 
(Razem) formed in May 2015 (Szczerbiak, 2016). The Democratic Left Alliance was 
one of the parties which introduced party quotas in 2001 resulting in the highest 
percentage of women in its ranks (25.4%) but women were under-represented in the 
party after the 2005, 2007, 2011 elections and constituted 20%, 20% and 15% 
respectively (see Gwiazda, 2016). Formally, it supported gender equality and gender 
quotas but informally there was no political will and the results clearly showed no 
commitment. It could have been different, had a new female joint leader of the United 
Left, Barbara Nowacka, had more time to promote women to top positions on party 
lists in winning constituencies but she was appointed only a few weeks before 
elections. In addition, it is worth noting that the ‘Together’ party had 20 women in the 
Number 1 place (out of 41 constituencies) and 50% of women in ‘1 in top 3’. 
However, neither the United Left nor ‘Together’ got seats in the Sejm because they 
did not reach the electoral threshold.
10
  
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) is an agrarian party established in 1990, where 
farmers constitute the traditional PSL electorate. It was a junior coalition partner in 
Democratic Left Alliance–led governments in the periods from 1993–7 and 2001–3 
and then Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner in 2007-11 and 2011-15. The PSL is 
known for conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society and has never 
systematically supported women in their ranks (Chełstowska et al., 2016). In 1991 
and 1993, the percentage of women in the party in the Sejm was 2% and 6% 
respectively; none in 1997 and 2001, and 4% in 2005 (see Gwiazda, 2016). Table 3 
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demonstrates that PSL had 3.2% (one woman) in 2007, 7.1% (two women) in 2011 
and 19% (three women) in 2015. In the parliamentary debate in February 2010, a PSL 
female deputy talked about both the conservative and liberal interests of women 
(Sejm, 2010). Most party deputies supported the bill on gender quotas but the party 
was not fully committed to it.  
The Palikot movement (RP) was set up in October 2010 by a former Civic 
Platform deputy, Janusz Palikot, as a new anti-clerical liberal party and emerged as 
the third largest grouping after the 2011 election with 10% of the vote and 40 seats 
(Szczerbiak, 2013). Although it formally supported gender equality, it did not actively 
promote women on lists as only five women were elected in 2011. In 2015, it was 
unsuccessful running as part of the United Left coalition. 
Kukiz‘15 is an anti-system populist movement set up in 2015 by the rock 
singer, Paweł Kukiz, who won 21% of the vote in the 2015 presidential election, 
finishing third. In the 2015 parliamentary election, Kukiz‘15 emerged as the third 
largest formation securing 8.8% of the vote and 42 seats in the Sejm (Markowski, 
2016; Szczerbiak, 2016). Kukiz‘15 largely consists of conservative activists and is 
known for conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society (Chełstowska 
et al., 2016). Kukiz‘15 is dominated by conservatives and nationalists and hence there 
was no place for women in the top ranks (Interview 2). 
The Modern party was formed in May 2015 by liberal economist Ryszard 
Petru. In the October 2015 election, it won 7.6% of the vote and emerged as the fourth 
largest party with 24 seats. It was supported by younger, well-educated, urban and 
entrepreneurial voters who were attracted by economically liberal attitudes once 
associated with Civic Platform which somehow departed from its market-oriented 
policy (Markowski, 2016). Apart from the legislative quotas, Modern further 
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promoted women using their own, internal regulations. It had no formal rules 
regarding women’s places on the lists. Yet it was confirmed in the interviews that 
Modern adopted an informal policy to promote women in the party. A female deputy 
from Modern confirmed that:  
 
There was no formal party resolution. This was rather an informal agreement supported 
by the party leader, Ryszard Petru. There was no systematic approach to women’s 
placement on party lists; in some cases it was about Number 1, in other cases, it was 
about one woman in the top three places or two women in the top five places. However, 
there is no denying that the Number 1 place was the most important (Interview 2).  
 
In fact, the interviewee said that she was a candidate No.1 on Modern list in the big 
city in southern Poland. She confirmed that a new party with liberal ideology made it 
easier for her to participate. ‘Modern represents liberal views and strong liberal 
women got involved with the formation of the new party in the regions’ (Interview 2). 
Another interviewee confirmed that ‘the party leader reckoned that a ‘modern’ party 
by definition should promote women in politics’ (Interview 1).  
The above analysis shows different preferences concerning gender equality. 
Parties with conservative preferences are also not fully committed to gender equality. 
The results for Law and Justice, the Polish Peasant Party and Kukiz‘15 show best how 
the absence of a gender-equality agenda and more conservative preferences can 
hinder women’s parliamentary representation. By contrast, centre-right and liberal 
parties endorsing liberal values are supportive. Civic Platform and Modern favour 
gender equality. They adopted additional provisions to facilitate women’s 
parliamentary representation. Civic Platform implemented a formal party quota with 
placement mandates where rank-ordering follows ‘1 in top 3’ and ‘2 in top 5’ rules. 
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Modern adopted an informal party quota with placement mandates mostly based on 
top ranking (Number 1). A woman deputy from the Modern party confirmed during 
interview that a high number of women was placed in the top place which resulted in 
the high percentage of women being elected. The Number 1 place was the most 
important for women’s electoral success (Interview 2). Party quotas with placement 
mandates contributed to women’s electoral success.  
Table 4 demonstrates the percentage of women in the Number 1 place and at 
least one woman in the top three places in 41 constituencies in 2011 and 2015. In 
2011 and 2015, the parties implemented the legislative gender quota of 35%, but most 
of them did not provide good places for women on the lists. In 2011 all parties, except 
Civic Platform, placed women in less favourable places. In 2015, all parties, except 
Civic Platform and Modern, placed women in less favourable places. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of women candidates in the first place and at least one woman in 
the top three places in 41 constituencies in 2011 and 2015. 
Party 2011 2015 
 Number 1 1 in top 3 Number 1 1 in top 3 
Civic Platform 
(PO) 
 
34% 40.1% 31.7% 40.6% 
Law and Justice 
(PiS) 
 
24.4% 21% 29.3% 26.8% 
Democratic Left 
Alliance/United 
Left (SLD) 
14.6% 36.6% 29% 32% 
Polish Peasant 
Party (PSL) 
 
14.6% 22% 14.6% 18.7% 
Palikot 
Movement (RP) 
 
10% 40% 0 0 
Modern 0 0 41.5% 36% 
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Kukiz‘15 
 
0 0 14.6% 24.4% 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the State Electoral Commission 2011; 
2015.  
 
In 2011, Civic Platform had women in the ‘Number 1’ place in 14 out of 41 
constituencies making it the party with the most women at the top of its lists (34%). It 
was also the party where the ‘1 in top 3’ rule was used in the largest number of 
constituencies (40.1%). As mentioned before, Civic Platform adopted party quotas 
which required women to be placed in top places. Other parties performed worse. 
Law and Justice had a similar percentage for Number 1 (24.4%) and ‘1 in top 3’ 
(21%). The placement of women lower down the list resulted in a low overall 
percentage of women (17.2%) elected from PiS lists. The Democratic Left Alliance 
placed only six women in the top places (14.6%) whereas in 36.6% of constituencies 
women constituted ‘1 in top 3.’ Being a relatively small party, SLD could hope to 
have candidates elected only from top places. Very few women were in the Number 1 
place and thus unsurprisingly this resulted in few women being elected: four out of 27 
deputies (14.8%). The Polish Peasant Party had six women in the Number 1 place 
(14.6%) whereas in 22% of constituencies women constituted ‘1 in top 3.’ PSL had 
only two women deputies among 28 deputies. The Palikot Movement had only four 
women candidates (10%) in the Number 1 place but in a high percentage of 
constituencies the party had ‘1 in top 3’ women. After elections, the party had 40 
deputies including five women (12.5%). The Number 1 place matters more than ‘1 in 
top 3’ for small parties because only one candidate is normally elected from the list. 
In 2015, Modern, with 41.5%, had the highest percentage of women placed in 
Number 1 which reflected the party quota based on top ranking. As a result, 12 out of 
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28 deputies were women which constituted 43% - the highest percentage among all 
parties. Civic Platform had 31.7% of women in the top place and 40.6% for ‘1 in top 
3’. Consequently, 50 out of 138 deputies were women which constituted 36%. The ‘1 
in top 3’ rule matters for a large party which can have several candidates elected from 
the list. Moreover, Civic Platform placed women candidates in top positions in 
winning constituencies as data published by the State Electoral Commission (2015) 
demonstrates. As for other parties, Law and Justice had less than 30%: 29.3% for 
Number 1 and 26.8% for ‘1 in top 3.’ After the election, women constituted 23% of 
all PiS deputies. The Polish Peasant Party and Kukiz‘15 performed poorly. Both 
parties had only 14.6% of women placed Number 1, nor did they have many women 
in top three places. Hence, overall results were modest: 14% for Kukiz‘15 and 19% 
for PSL. 
In 2015 the United Left, which included the Democratic Left Alliance, had 
31.7% of women in the top three places; and Number 1 in 12 out of 41 constituencies 
(29.3%). The percentage of women in the top three places was lower in comparison to 
2011 but there were more women in Number 1 in 2015. The number increased from 
six to 12. However, an estimation of how many women the United Left alliance 
would have returned to parliament if the coalition had reached the 8% threshold 
shows that results would be similar to 2011: that is, four women could have chances 
of being elected to the Sejm. Women were placed in the Number 1 place in four 
winning constituencies (that is, constituencies where the party elected their deputies in 
previous elections). 
The aforementioned analysis underscores the importance of placement on 
party lists. There is a positive relationship between the top place on the party list and 
chances of being elected. The most prestigious and successful place is considered to 
be the first place (Number 1). Calculations based on the data provided by the State 
Electoral Commission (2011; 2015) show that for the two largest parties (PO and PiS) 
99% of candidates ranked Number 1 got elected in 2011 and 88% in 2015.
11
 A 
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bivariate analysis between the variables 'place on the list' and ‘being elected or not’ 
confirms that the place on the party list is important. A t-test to evaluate whether the 
average place on the list is different for candidates who are elected and those who are 
not confirms this. In the elections of 2011 and 2015, the average place on the list for 
elected candidates is 4th and for non-elected candidates is 12th. In both elections, this 
difference is statistically significant at a level of p < .01. Moreover, a logistic 
regression predicting the probability of a candidate to be elected by her place on the 
list confirms the importance of placement. Results indicate that the odds of being 
elected increase by 74% for each ‘jump’ of one place on the list for the 2015 election, 
and by 72% for the 2011 election. In both instances, this effect is statistically 
significant at a level of p < .01. 
The Polish case confirms that placement mandates increase the chances of 
electing women to parliament. If they are absent, parties do not have any incentive to 
place women in top positions if they do not support gender equality. In fact, parties 
can ‘cheat’, pushing women to the lowest places (see Kublik, 2015). Thus, the quota 
without placement mandates is not very effective because women usually end up at 
places which are not winnable. Consequently, it is not enough to place women on the 
lists: they must also occupy high places. However, there is one caveat here. Placement 
mandates as such might not be sufficient, but should be used in conjunction with 
sanctions. Hypothesis 1 stipulates that the presence of both high penalties and 
placement mandates should increase the effectiveness of gender quotas. If there are no 
penalties for non-compliance, parties not favouring gender equality will not be 
encouraged to comply with gender quotas. Hence, high penalties are important too. 
This brings us to highlighting the main findings of this study. First, the 
assertion about party preferences has been corroborated (Hypothesis 2). Political 
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parties enhance women’s parliamentary representation if their preferences are 
congruent with gender equality. The cases of Civic Platform and ‘Modern’ 
demonstrate that political parties can facilitate the election of women to office. In 
Poland, they did so by introducing party quotas. By contrast, examples of other parties 
such as PiS and PSL show that parties do not fully commit to enhancing women’s 
representation, or take steps to reduce the impact of quotas, by adding women only at 
the bottom of their party lists, in unelectable positions. Whereas SLD and PSL did not 
oppose quotas directly, there was no political will within the parties to enhance 
women’s representation. Second, this research shows that both formal and informal 
party quotas contributed to enhancing women’s parliamentary representation. The two 
parties which performed very well adopted internal party regulations which stipulated 
that women should be promoted to top positions. Party quotas can be either formal or 
informal: Civic Platform adopted a formal resolution on placement mandates; by 
contrast, Modern had an informal agreement concerning women’s placement on party 
lists and thus used informal institutions. Mainstream comparative research on political 
institutions focuses primarily on formal rules and ignores other types of institutions 
(see Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Yet many ‘rules of the game’ that structure political 
life are informal. According to North (1990), informal institutions are ‘informal 
constraints which come from socially transmitted information’ (North 1990: 37). 
Informal party quotas are as important and effective as formal party quotas. Third, 
this research confirms that the mandate placement is an important institutional 
provision. The more women are in the top places, the more women are elected to 
parliament. Number 1 is the most important place on the list. The effectiveness of ‘1 
in top 3’ provision depends on the size of the party. For large parties, it matters; for 
small parties, the effect is negligible. This is because large parties can have several 
 26 
candidates elected, whereas small parties can hope for only one candidate being 
elected, who is usually Number 1 on the list. Nevertheless, the main implication is 
that additional provisions on placement mandates should increase the number of 
women elected to office. Fourth, as discussed above, policy design should be based on 
a combination of high penalty for non-compliance and placement mandates. 
Placement mandates without any sanctions for non-compliance might be ineffective. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The primary objective of legislative gender quotas is to increase the number of 
women elected to parliaments. By examining the case of Poland, this article 
demonstrates that although political parties have formally implemented gender quotas 
for the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections, the effectiveness of legislative gender 
quotas was limited. It is argued that effectiveness depends on institutions (policy 
design) and the preferences of political parties. Effective gender quotas should include 
a provision on placement mandates and a high penalty for non-compliance. Moreover, 
the preferences of political parties are important. Political parties supporting gender 
equality are expected to promote women’s parliamentary representation.  
This article contributes to the scholarly literature in several respects. First, 
self-imposed formal and informal party quotas with placement mandates which 
complement legislative gender quotas have not been investigated previously. Existing 
studies overlook the importance of the combination of party quotas and legislative 
gender quotas. Second, the support of gender quotas by centre-right and liberal parties 
has not been discussed extensively. The literature demonstrates that centre-left parties 
are more supportive of gender quotas. The Polish case shows that liberal and liberal-
conservative parties (Modern and Civic Platform) supported gender equality and 
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gender quotas. Third, the application of rational choice institutionalism allows 
examining both institutions (policy design) and political actors, which can shed more 
light on the interaction of different factors contributing to the effectiveness of gender 
quotas. Finally, it shows how the logic of advancing gender quotas took place in 
Poland and explains nuances of gender quota effectiveness. In sum, the case of Poland 
sheds more light on the effectiveness of gender quotas in a new democracy from 
Eastern Europe. 
Further research should investigate if the use of quotas is becoming more 
effective over time because of incumbency effects and normative changes. The 
political science literature shows that there is a strong incumbency effect. Incumbents 
have a very high probability of re-election (Erikson, 1971; Gelman and King, 1990). 
This assertion should be tested for women representatives elected to parliament. 
Moreover, the literature points to the positive effects of changing norms. Over time 
increasing norms of equality are expected to decrease political party efforts to sidestep 
quota targets (Paxton and Hughes, 2015). Thus, the time factor should be taken into 
consideration in the future. 
To sum up, the Polish case shows strong partisan and institutional effects on 
women’s parliamentary representation. In the case of ineffective gender quota policy, 
political parties decide on women’s representation. Parties supporting gender equality 
have introduced formal and informal party quotas in order to increase the chances of 
women being elected to parliament. There is no denying that the support of political 
parties makes a difference, but institutions are equally important.  
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1
 In Ireland, gender quotas were used for the first time in February 2016 elections. It resulted in an 
increase of the number of women from 15% in 2011 to 22% in 2016 in the Dáil. 
2
 EU member states using gender quotas had the following women’s representation: Belgium 39%, 
Spain 39%, Slovenia 36%, Portugal 31%, France 27%, Poland 27%, Croatia 26%, Greece 23% and 
Ireland 22% (IDEA, 2016). 
3
 Poland, Slovenia and Croatia are three countries which are now members of the European Union 
from the former communist bloc, and which use gender quotas. Other Balkan countries also use quotas 
including Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
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4
 The literature points to a third institutional provision too, that is, the gender quota size. But it will not 
be examined here because it has remained the same in Poland (quota size of 35%).  
5
 Three parties, the Freedom Union, the Labour Union and the Democratic Left Alliance, introduced 
party quotas of at least 30% of each gender on candidates’ lists for the 2001 election. 
6
 While there has been a steady increase in women’s representation in the Sejm, the representation of 
women in the Senate has been very poor and remained at a low level of around 12% because of the 
majoritarian electoral system and the lack of gender quotas (see Gwiazda, 2016). 
7
 The elections of 1989 were semi-free for the Sejm where 65% of seats were reserved for the 
communists, but they were freely contested for a re-established Senate. 
8
 Journal of Laws 2011, No. 34, item 172; Journal of Laws 2011, No. 21, item 112. 
9
 Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński served respectively as Poland’s president and prime minister. Lech died 
in a plane crash in 2010, while Jarosław has been since the party’s leader. 
10
 In fact, there are two electoral thresholds: 8% for coalitions (which was the United Left) and 5% for 
individual political parties (which was the ‘Together’ party). 
11
 The chances of being elected decrease with the ranking in lower positions, e.g. Number 2 – 90%; 
Number 3 – 68% for 2011; and Number 2- 80% and Number 3 – 60% for 2015. 
12
 Research Ethics Number MR/16/17-447. 
 
